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From the Pacific W ar to the 
Great D epression1
Introduction
Research on British business in Peru has been informed by two debates, 
each of which has generated a substantial literature. The first is the con­
troversy over imperialism and dependency, which dominated research 
in this field for twenty years. A number of different intellectual tradi­
tions converged to stimulate this debate in the late 1960s, the most 
important being the work inspired by the path-breaking article o f John 
Gallagher and Robert Robinson (1953) on the imperialism of free trade, 
and the school o f dependency writing that emerged in Latin America 
under the influence of authors like André Gunder Frank and Fernando 
Henrique Cardoso. Historians concerned with this controversy concen­
trated on investigating supposed inequalities of power and bargaining 
(Miller 1999). In the Peruvian context its influence can be seen in the 
contrasting interpretations of the role of foreign capital put forward by 
historians like W. M. Mathew (1968; 1977; 1981) and Ernesto Yepes 
del Castillo (1972). The second major influence, much more evident 
since the mid-1980s, is mainstream research in business history. One 
significant debate has centred on the apparent tardiness of the British in 
establishing modem forms of company organisation in contrast to their 
US counterparts, and the extent to which the ‘backwardness’ of the 
British firm contributed to the country’s economic problems (Chandler
1980). In the 1980s Chandler’s comparison o f British and US firms and 
later research on early British multinational enterprise helped to 
stimulate two significant conceptual advances, when Stanley Chapman
1 My thanks are due to Colin Lewis and Bill Albert for reading previous drafts of 
this chapter. They bear no responsibility for its contents.
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(1985; 1992) and Mira Wilkins (1988; Wilkins/Schröter 1998) proposed 
the concepts of the merchant-based investment group and the free­
standing company respectively. This helped to reintegrate research on 
British firms in Latin America with British business history: both 
Chapman and Wilkins referred to cases of British firms which invested 
on the west coast o f South America. The key questions in this literature 
centre on understanding the dynamics, institutional structures, and 
management of British firms overseas, rather than their power and 
bargaining capacity.
It goes without saying that there is an obvious dialectic between 
these broader debates and empirical research on British business in 
Peru. Ideas o f informal imperialism and dependency soon had an 
influence on historians working in Peru itself on the British role in the 
country (Bonilla 1972; Burga/Flores Galindo 1979; Burga/Reátegui
1981). These assumptions dominated scholarship for twenty years. It 
was not really until the very end of the 1980s, with the research of a 
younger generation of historians like Alfonso Quiroz, that ‘dependency’ 
began to be regarded more sceptically and the autonomy and dynamism 
of the domestic business elite was better appreciated (Quiroz 1988). 
This change in viewpoint gathered pace in the 1990s. In Peru, as else­
where in Latin America, perspectives on the role of foreign business are 
now being transformed. Much greater emphasis is being placed on local 
agents of change, internal circuits of commerce, and the particular 
features and dynamic of Peruvian business organisation. At the same 
time improvements in our understanding of British business in Latin 
America as a whole are throwing into relief the peculiar features of 
Britain’s participation in the Peruvian economy. The contrast is quite 
striking. In those countries where British investment became concen­
trated in the generation before 1914 (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico), the significance of the ordinary merchant declined while that 
of the merchant banks and large companies based in the City of London 
increased (Miller 1993: chaps. 5-7). In the larger countries the latter 
became the most visible symbol of British business interests. This was 
not the case in Peru. Here merchant houses, together with a handful of 
free-standing companies, remained the dominant actors in the business 
relationship. Grasping this point is fundamental to understanding both 
the evolution and the influence of British business in Peru, and the rea-
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sons for this distinct pattern o f development thus require some 
explanation.
First, the experiences o f the guano period and the consequences of 
the massive default of 1876 meant that the history of British purchases 
and holdings o f Peruvian government bonds was unique. Most Peruvian 
government borrowing, based on revenues from the guano trade, was 
concentrated between 1848 and 1872. During this period Peru issued a 
series o f loans o f increasing nominal value- £  2.6 million in 1853, £ 5.5 
million in 1862, £ 10.0 million in 1865 -  to consolidate previous 
borrowings and finance fiscal deficits. The increasingly chaotic state of 
government finances, a morass of internal and external debts and sums 
due to guano contractors and domestic banks, culminated in the ill-fated 
drive to ‘turn guano into railways’ on the basis of two massive loans 
with a nominal value of £ 33.2 million in 1870 and 1872, just when the 
quality, quantity, and price of guano exports were declining (Palacios 
Moreyra 1983: chap. 3). Default quickly followed in 1876. Although the 
government cancelled the debt in 1889 by transferring major assets, 
including the state railways, land concessions, and a monopoly on 
guano exports, to its creditors, Peru never again returned to London for 
large loans (Miller 1976).
Second, British-controlled banking and insurance companies were 
also largely absent from Peru. The Lima branch of the London Bank of 
Mexico and South America, which dated from 1863, was one of only 
two Peruvian banks to survive the Pacific War, and it merged with the 
Banco del Callao to form the Banco del Perú y Londres in 1897. Hence­
forth London financiers retained only a minority holding. For the most 
part the Banco del Perú y Londres may be considered a domestic 
Peruvian institution, although there were brief periods, especially in the 
decade before the First World War, when foreign control from Paris and 
London strengthened (Joslin 1963: 213; Quiroz 1993: 67, 76-77). Pe­
ruvian capitalists also took over the insurance sector after Congress 
approved a number o f measures regulating foreign insurance companies 
between 1895 and 1902. This campaign compelled them to invest in 
local real estate or internal bonds and eventually provoked the with­
drawal of all the British firms which had formerly used agents (often 
merchants) to write business in Peru (Garland 1908: 306-307).
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Third, due to Peru’s peculiar mix of exports, commodity markets in 
Britain remained important long after their significance had declined for 
other countries. This applied especially to cotton and wool, to a lesser 
extent to sugar and minerals. While the role of the British market, as 
Figure 1 suggests, diminished slightly in the first decade of the twen­
tieth century, as new exports o f copper and petroleum found outlets 
elsewhere, its share of a rapidly growing trade subsequently remained 
largely stationary until the mid-1920s. It was only the outbreak of the 
Second World War which pushed the British share o f Peru’s exports 
permanently below 20 per cent. This sustained role of the British 
market, particularly for the specialised varieties o f wool and cotton 
produced in Peru, provides at least a partial explanation for the con­
tinued influence of British merchants in key economic sectors. It was 
also o f some political significance, since Britain remained an important 
market for those export sectors not under foreign ownership, including 
the powerful sugar producers (Albert 1982: 123-126).
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One further point needs to be made by way of introduction. Unlike most 
of the British firms in larger countries like Argentina, Brazil, and 
Mexico, many of those operating in Peru worked in neighbouring 
economies and in other countries in the Pacific Basin. This practice 
dated back to the time of independence when merchants like Antony 
Gibbs & Sons and the precursors of Graham Rowe founded associated 
houses in both Valparaiso and Lima. It was reinforced in the mid­
nineteenth century by the growth of the nitrate trade, which linked pro­
duction in the Peruvian province of Tarapacá with the commercial 
centre of Valparaiso in Chile. The coastwise exchange o f Peruvian 
sugar for Chilean wheat and flour had also continued after inde­
pendence, with some firms engaged in both. Many of the merchant 
houses thus developed activities in both the major economies o f the 
west coast. In some cases they extended them to other parts of the 
Pacific, Gibbs to Australia and Balfour Williamson to California. Some 
of the major free-standing companies in Peru also had interests in neigh­
bouring countries. The Peruvian Corporation competed for the rail 
traffic of the Bolivian altiplano, while Lobitos Oilfields developed pro­
duction facilities in Ecuador and sales outlets in Chile. The other major 
firm in the Peruvian oil industry, London and Pacific Petroleum 
Company, was initially developed by a partner of the famous Anglo- 
Chinese house Jardine Matheson, and its name suggests the hopes he 
held for a transoceanic trade.
T he P eruvian  background
One of the most striking characteristics of the Peruvian economy from 
1840 until 1970 was the frequency with which new exports appeared 
whenever existing ones ran into difficulties (Thorp/Bertram 1978). Peru 
was never a monocultural economy like Chile or Brazil. Even at its peak 
guano seldom accounted for more than two-thirds of exports, and this 
proportion was declining after the early 1850s.2 Silver exports recovered
2 Peruvian export statistics in the n ineteenth century are fraught w ith difficulties as 
regards both volum es and values. The m ost careful reconstruction o f  export vo l­
um es, but using 1900 price w eights, is H unt (1973), from  w hich these po in ts are 
drawn.
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relatively quickly after independence and remained significant through­
out the nineteenth century (Deustua 1986). The trade in sheep and 
alpaca wool from the south also began to develop from the 1840s 
(Miller 1982a; Jacobsen 1984). The capital accumulation o f the guano 
period then helped both domestic and foreign entrepreneurs to diversify 
into nitrate, sugar and cotton.3
Following Peru’s defeat by Chile in the Pacific War (1879-83) the 
volume of exports collapsed to less than a quarter of the pre-war peak. 
Nevertheless recovery, initially based on silver and sugar, was not long 
delayed. After the m id-1890s there were successive spurts o f growth in 
wool, cotton, copper, rubber, and petroleum. As a consequence export 
volumes doubled between 1891 and 1900, doubled again in the follow­
ing decade (surpassing the pre-war peak of 1874 in the process), and 
doubled yet again by 1923 (Thorp/Bertram 1978: 5). In the 1930s and 
1940s the country’s experience again contrasted with the Latin Ameri­
can norm. Peru recovered relatively quickly from the Depression, but 
then export performance slowed until the exploitation of new mineral 
deposits and fishmeal brought two more decades of growth in the 1950s 
and 1960s (Thorp/Bertram 1978: 151-154, 208-210).
The ‘open’ economy which this history of export success stimulated 
helped to retard industrialisation and, in contrast to the era when guano 
was dominant, fostered a relatively weak and non-interventionist state 
after the Pacific War. There was little need for the state to intervene in 
the export economy, whether to regulate production or support prices 
(in contrast to Brazil), or else to extract a fiscal rent from foreign owned 
mineral exports (in contrast to Chile or Venezuela). Most exporters 
actively opposed any intervention in their affairs by the state. Public 
expenditure remained at a relatively low level, roughly half that of 
Chile, a country of similar size and population (calculated from Mitchell 
1983). Moreover, Peruvian entrepreneurs, whether locally bom or im­
migrant, remained in control o f much of the country’s agriculture, 
leaving foreign firms in intermediary roles or in sectors like mining and 
petroleum where larger infusions o f capital and technology were re­
3 See especially  B erm udez M iral (1963); M acera (1977, IV); Engelson (1977); Bell
(1985).
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quired. Taken together, these features provide the background against 
which British business in Peru evolved.
Although they had initially arrived as importers, British merchants 
inserted themselves into this export economy from an early stage. Most 
famously, of course, Antony Gibbs & Sons acted as the Peruvian gov­
ernment’s main guano consignees and financial agents in Europe from 
the inception o f the fertiliser trade in 1840 until 1862 (Mathew 1981). 
Less well known is the way in which the merchant house o f Schröders 
in London also extracted substantial profits from its involvement in the 
later stages of the guano trade in the 1870s (Roberts 1992: 82-86). The 
trade stimulated by guano provided the foundation for capital accumula­
tion by Gibbs and other foreign and Peruvian entrepreneurs. This in turn 
opened opportunities for British firms elsewhere in the economy. The 
clearest direct link lies in the expansion o f nitrate exports from Tara- 
pacá, which increased from 86,659 tons in 1868 to 326,869 in 1875, 
competing with guano in European fertiliser markets. With Gibbs again 
to the fore British mercantile interests came to dominate a large share of 
this industry. By the early 1870s they were fulfilling a range o f func­
tions: trading nitrate on the Valparaiso market, financing and consigning 
it on behalf o f small producers, and operating oficinas themselves 
(Greenhill/Miller 1973: 119). When the Peruvian government made its 
vain attempt to rationalise the business after 1875 by expropriating 
oficinas, curtailing production, and attempting to manipulate the market 
with the output from the state’s plants, it almost inevitably turned to 
Gibbs to manage the oficinas transferred to the public sector and act as 
its principal consignees abroad (Greenhill/Miller 1973: 118-121).
The degree of British intermediation in Peru’s other exports before 
the Pacific War varied. British houses seem to have supplied little 
capital or credit, for example, to the pre-war sugar industry (Garland 
1895: 12; Macera 1977, IV: 149). There was, however, some participa­
tion in cotton when producers responded to price rises during the US 
civil war. Both Graham Rowe and Green Nicholson of Liverpool, for 
example, advanced credit to Domingo Elias, the principal planter in lea, 
against future cotton shipments, and made arrangements for purchases
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elsewhere on the coast.4 However, the case of the wool trade o f southern 
Peru offers the best example of British merchants playing a central role 
in a regional economy. This arose from the specialised nature of the 
trade and the location o f its principal markets, especially for the fine 
alpaca fibre, in the north of England (Jacobsen 1993: 60-61, 161-167). 
By the mid-1870s four houses o f British origin -  Gibbs, Stafford, Flet­
cher Ryan, and Woodgate -  handled all but a small proportion o f the 
sheep’s and alpaca wool exported through the major entrepot of Are­
quipa.5
T he m erchants after the P acific  W ar
Peru’s defeat in the War of the Pacific sealed the collapse o f an export 
economy based on guano and nitrate, the two principal agricultural 
fertilisers in nineteenth-century international trade. The best-quality 
guano deposits had already been exhausted. Now many of the remaining 
ones, together with all Peru’s nitrate resources, were lost to Chile. By 
the time of the Treaty o f Ancón in 1883 the coastal economy, in par­
ticular, was in disarray. The Chileans had destroyed much of the ma­
chinery on the sugar estates as well as railway equipment. Paper money 
was circulating at a fraction of its nominal value. Only two of the pre­
war banks had survived, while many other sources of credit had dried 
up. Both Gibbs and Huth, for example, had retreated from Peru in order 
to concentrate on their activities in Chile: other foreign houses like La 
Chambre and Prévost went into liquidation.6 The government had little 
hope of recommencing payments on its external loans and thus re­
establishing access to foreign capital markets, which were booming in 
the 1880s and were assumed by most influential Peruvians to be essen­
tial for the country’s recovery. Many post-war politicians perceived
4 A rchivo G eneral de la N ación (Lim a), Protocolos N otariales de Lim a, José de 
Selaya 1862, vol. 725, fols. 2201v-2203v; José de Selaya 1862, vol. 726, fols. 
2491v-2492v, fols. 2498r-2499v.
5 A requipa to  Lim a, 19 January 1876, GL, G ibbs archive, file 11124.
6 AFA, Cayalti archive K 201, A spíllaga H erm anos to H enry Kendall and Sons, 
21 M arch 1885.
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little alternative but to attempt to negotiate the transfer of state-owned 
assets to the bondholders in exchange for the cancellation o f the debt. 
As a consequence, at the end of 1889, the Cáceres government signed 
the unpopular Grace Contract with the foreign bondholders, and the 
following year the Peruvian Corporation was founded to manage their 
newly acquired assets, which included the railways, land and mineral 
concessions, and the right to export guano.7
However, despite the withdrawal of some of its leading members 
such as Gibbs, other elements of the British merchant community 
survived the war successfully. Indeed the lack of other sources o f credit 
enhanced their role, especially on the coast. Liverpool-based merchants, 
in particular, remained significant. Graham Rowe, Duncan Fox, Mathi- 
son Beausire (later H. M. Beausire and Co.), and Wm. & Jno. Lockett 
all figured in a list of the leading thirteen merchants in Lima in the late 
1880s (Bollinger 1971: 73). In addition Henry Kendall and Sons of 
London developed close links as consignees and creditors with some 
sugar and cotton hacendados, although they never established an office 
in Peru (Gonzales 1985: 35). The British presence in the Arequipa wool 
trade also persisted, although new firms such as Gibsons and Ricketts 
replaced those which had vanished during the war (Jacobsen 1993: 
190).
In the sugar industry the pressures of the market, environmental and 
ecological conditions in Peru, and changing technology all stimulated 
the concentration of production in large plantations located in a small 
number of coastal valleys between 1880 and 1914.Because ofthe scale 
o f production on individual estates as the industry consolidated, only 
those merchants with access to substantial financial resources could 
really become involved in sugar. Plantations needed both short-term 
credit and long-term mortgages to finance the acquisition o f land and 
transport, milling, and refining equipment (Albert 1976: 25a-64a). 
Kendalls’ mortgage on the Cayalti plantation, agreed with the Aspillaga 
family in 1884, for example, involved a sum of £ 32,000.8 This, together
7 M iller (1976); Basadre (1962,VI: 2749-70); Q uiroz (1983); C layton (1985: 
chap. 7); Jam es (1993: chap. 15).
8 A FA , C ayalti archive, K201, A spillaga H erm anos to Prévost & Co., 13 A ugust 
1883.
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with the fact that sugar production in Peru was a year-round activity, 
tied producers closely to their merchant partners, and made it difficult 
for them to break commercial and financial links once they had initiated 
them. The British participation in the sugar trade was substantial, but it 
was by no means dominant. There was always the threat that the larger 
producers would accumulate sufficient resources to be able to manage 
without them, establishing direct connections with their markets. Thus 
the two largest plantations in the Chicama valley, Casa Grande and 
Cartavio, did not depend on British merchants, but on finance from the 
Gildemeister and Grace family fortunes. Instead British houses tended 
to provide the credit and commercial connexions for the successful 
medium-scale producers, Graham Rowe, for instance, for the various 
plantations belonging to members o f the Larco family, Kendalls for 
Cayalti and Pomalca.9 Generally the trade functioned on a consignment 
basis. The merchants charged commissions both on sales of sugar in 
Britain and on the supplies they purchased for the plantations as well as 
receiving interest on the mortgages and the short-term credit represented 
by the bills of exchange which the planters drew on them against the 
security of the shipments they had made. While Peruvian producers did 
complain at times about their dependence on foreign intermediaries, on 
the whole the potential for abuse by merchants trading on consignment 
was limited, especially once producers began to negotiate their own 
sales on the Chilean market.10
The merchant role in the cotton trade, which began to grow signifi­
cantly during the first decade o f the twentieth century, was quite dis­
tinct, partly because of the different structure o f production. In contrast 
to the large consolidated sugar plantations, the British merchants dealt 
with hundreds of smaller estates situated in most o f the fifty valleys 
along the Peruvian coast. However, it was not only the difference of 
size and scale that was important. Unlike sugar, which had to be milled 
quickly, the processing equipment for cotton could be located some
9 V ictor Larco apparently  severed his connection w ith G raham  R ow e in 1922, 
tu rning to the L im a banks for finance: H. E. D aw son to A. S. Cooper, 2 Septem ber 
1922, file 62, Peruvian C orporation archive, Lim a; K endalls started to finance 
Pom alca in 1912: AFA, Cayalti archive, K 2 1 1, L im a to London, 30 M arch 1912.
10 A FA , Cayalti archive, K 2 11.
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distance from estate boundaries. Sales of cotton to local textile factories 
also took a significant and increasing share o f output. The demand for 
credit concentrated on short-term habilitaciones secured on each annual 
crop rather than long-term mortgages. Moreover, as well as trading on 
consignment, merchants often bought cotton on the coast and shipped it 
at their own risk.11
These differences are well-known, but the day-to-day operations of 
the trade are much more poorly documented than that in sugar, and the 
extent o f British participation more obscure. Other foreign and Peruvian 
merchants in Lima, as well as the banks founded at the turn o f the cen­
tury, made loans to producers. However, British houses do appear to 
have taken a major share of the business, helped by the fact that Lanca­
shire (and Yorkshire) remained significant markets for the specialised 
cotton varieties cultivated in Peru until the Second World War. Almost 
every British merchant in Lima, but particularly perhaps Duncan Fox, 
H. M. Beausire, Alexander Eccles & Co., and Wm. & Jno. Lockett, fi­
nanced and speculated in cotton in the early twentieth century. The fact 
that most loans were for six or nine months, rather than years, reduced 
the barriers to entry, permitting producers to switch from one merchant 
to another and leaving space for new houses to enter the trade. 
Nevertheless, as the trade grew, control of ginning, and hence of the 
lucrative by-products of cottonseed oil and cake, shifted from land­
owners to the merchant sector. Duncan Fox were expanding their 
ginning facilities in Piura, a region they came to dominate, in 1891.12 By 
1920 they also owned gins in Pisco, Huacho, Tambo, and Lima. Beau- 
sires had been producing cotton-seed oil in Pisco since before 1906 
(Thorp/Bertram 1977: 52; Pachas Castilla 1976: 37). Duncan Fox and 
the US house of Grace also came to control the most important cotton 
textile mills in Lima. However, discussion of anything but the broad
11 This m ade specialist cotton traders m ore vulnerable. J. L ionel B arber collapsed in 
the 1921 recession, and G raham  Rowe in 1931, both apparently as a  result o f  their 
exposure to falling cotton prices: interview  w ith H enry B eausire, L iverpool, 
A ugust 1974; U niversity  C ollege (London), Balfour W illiam son archive, letter 
book 6, A rchibald W illiam son to Frederick M ilne, 23 A ugust 1920; West Coast 
Leader, 19 January 1932.
12 W igan R ecord Office, D uncan Fox papers, ECC 1556/4, R. S. Tem ple to T hom as 
W oodsend, 7 July 1891.
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trends in this trade is plagued by the disappearance of the merchants’ 
archives.13 In particular this means that it is impossible to ascertain 
details of the merchants’ income from these trades and the extent to 
which this dominance of credit and processing allowed them to control 
producers. One point is clear, though, namely that the price fluctuations 
o f cotton after 1920 exposed those merchants who traded on their own 
account and also led them into production as a result o f having to 
foreclose on debts and take over estates. This had fatal consequences for 
one of the most important trading houses in 1931.
More is known about the wool trade of the south where one major 
archive, that o f the Arequipa house which William Ricketts founded in 
1895, has survived.14 Here the British market, although diminishing, re­
mained the most significant until the 1930s (Miller 1979: 91). Similarly, 
although other immigrant merchants like Forga, Yriberry, and Said 
began slowly to erode the British merchants’ share o f the trade, the 
overall dominance o f houses like Stafford, now joined by newcomers 
like Gibson and Ricketts, continued. These three firms accounted for 
67 per cent of the alpaca and 56 per cent o f the sheep’s wool exports 
from Moliendo in 1923, one o f the very few years for which detailed 
statistics have survived. Gibsons alone shipped 43 per cent of the alpa­
ca, 31 per cent o f the sheep’s wool (Bedoya 1924). The British houses 
in Arequipa retained a precarious and circumscribed independence for 
a long time due to the specialised knowledge, contacts, and reputation 
demanded by the trade, especially in alpaca. As the railway and tele­
graph improved communications they extended their direct influence 
deeper into the sierra by establishing branches and collection points and 
employing increasing numbers of agents (rescatistas) to purchase wool 
directly rather than at fairs.
13 G raham  R ow e’s archives disappeared after their collapse in 1931; B eausires’, both 
in L iverpool and Lim a, w ere destroyed to save office space, as was the com plete 
run o f  D uncan F o x ’s Liverpool-L im a partnership correspondence in the late 1960s.
14 T hese papers, w hich were deposited in the AFA, form  the basis for B urga/R eátegui 
(1981). The R icketts fam ily, like the G ibsons, becam e absorbed into the arequi- 
peño elite, losing its distinctly  B ritish identity, as control passed from  the founder 
to later generations. The com plete archive o f  Frank M ichell & Sons, a m ajor w ool 
house founded by a B ritish im m igrant in 1931, was still in existence in 1972, but 
appears now  to have disappeared.
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Most historians believe that the balance of power, and hence of 
profits, in the wool trade tended to lie with the merchants. Nils Jacobsen 
(1993: 189, 191), for example, argues that “as trading networks in the 
altiplano became denser, the Arequipa export and import houses 
strengthened their position vis-à-vis the other groups involved”, and that 
they “exercised the predominant influence over short-term wool prices 
in the altiplano” . Yet it is not so easy to put a figure on this. Manuel 
Burga’s estimate of an average profit rate of over 10 per cent for 
Ricketts, surpassing the normal rents from landownership in the region, 
rests on the experience of just one house and seems to confuse the 
concepts o f profit margin and rate of return on capital employed 
(Burga/Flores Galindo 1979: 44-45; Burga/Reátegui 1981: 180-182).15 
As Jacobsen (1982: 258-259) pointed out in a review, if  profits were so 
much higher in trade, it makes it difficult to understand Gibsons’ move 
into landownership in 1926. Other evidence suggests that both theres- 
catistas and the hacendados, who became more involved in the export 
trade as sheep’s wool replaced alpaca as the more valuable component, 
took advantage of the competition among the Arequipa houses.
This highlights the problems of reconciling a priori assumptions 
about the power o f intermediaries, based on their greater access to in­
formation and credit, with the realities of the archives. Local land­
owners and politicians were frequently critical of the merchants, as well 
as the Peruvian Corporation, blaming the British intermediaries for 
impeding the development of the region by paying low prices for wool 
and imposing high charges for their services (Burga/Flores Galindo 
1979: 34, 44-45). One obvious way in which a group o f British mer­
chants might have exploited local producers is through the establish­
ment of a purchasing cartel to set the prices paid to wool producers or 
indigenous traders. Flowever, there is little evidence that they did so 
successfully after the Pacific War. Burga and Reátegui (1981: 81), on 
the basis of the Ricketts’ archives, state that such alliances were “frag­
ile, opportunistic, and rarely long lasting”. Moreover, the manner in 
which the trade was restructured in the late 1920s and early 1930s 
underlines the difficulties of the Arequipa merchants. Part of the prob­
15 A sim ilar error w as m ade by Pablo M acera in analysing  the rates o f  return  on 
railw ays belonging to the Peruvian C orporation (M acera/H unt 1977: 553).
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lem lay in the volatility of wool prices during that decade, but this was 
exacerbated by the ruinous competition for wool in which Gibsons and 
Staffords, the two principal exporters, engaged. One of Gibbs’ partners, 
taken aback at the extent of the rivalry between merchants related by 
marriage (the chief partners were brothers-in-law), termed it a “fight to 
the death”.16 Both were forced, as a result, to look for injections of 
capital from outside. Balfour Williamson invested £ 300,000 to acquire 
51 per cent of Gibsons in 1929, while Gibbs acquired Huths’ interest in 
the failing house o f Stafford.17 However, this did not solve the prob­
lems. Gibbs and Balfour Williamson, already accustomed to operating 
a purchasing cartel with Duncan Fox in the Chilean wheat trade, now 
attempted to do the same for Peruvian wool. This, however, simply 
opened the way for new competitors to outbid them. These included 
Patten Michell, which was founded in 1931 by a former employee of 
Staffords and supported financially by Henry Kendall and Sons, as well 
as more aggressive firms like Said Hermanos and Grace, who now 
completely changed the traditional alpaca trade by offering premium 
prices for particular colours, further eroding the position of the older 
firms.18
Evaluating the merchants
How should the British merchant interest in Peru after the War o f the 
Pacific be evaluated in the light of the debates about the dynamism of 
British enterprise overseas and business imperialism? Even their com­
patriots had some doubts about their role. “The great British houses in 
Peru”, one official wrote in 1929, “the backbone of the trade between 
the two countries, are described euphemistically as ‘conservative’. Ex­
ports are their principal interest.”19 In one sense this was correct. The 
leading merchants had largely neglected the general import business
16 D obree to K orn, 27 A ugust 1931, GL, G ibbs archive, file 16875/3.
17 D obree to K orn, 27 A ugust 1931, GL, G ibbs archive, file 16875/3.
18 Interview  w ith Frank M ichell, A requipa, 17 April 1972; M ichell archive (A re­
quipa), caja 2, Patten M ichell to H enry Kendall &  Sons, 13 July  1933.
19 M em o by J. V. K. D ible, 31 M ay 1929, PRO, FO  371/13507/A4076.
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since the mid-nineteenth century, leaving the field to a variety o f Pe­
ruvian and immigrant traders. As the head o f Balfour Williamson had 
written in 1910, when evaluating the prospects for Milne & Co., in 
which they had just acquired a controlling interest: “Too much must not 
be expected in the way of an import business in Lima. It is a very small 
market compared even with Chile. And that is not large in the world’s 
commerce.”20 British involvement in imports concentrated on the ‘tied’ 
trade in hardware and machinery for the estates they financed, on which 
they gained useful commissions, and on agencies for branded consumer 
products produced in Great Britain. The most significant exception, 
perhaps, was Graham Rowe who attempted to build up a wider import­
ing business in machinery and motor vehicles in the 1920s, although 
they often found themselves compelled to deal in US marquets as a 
result of British manufacturing inadequacies.21
The charge of being ‘conservative’, however, does not seem entirely 
justified, and results rather from a conflict of outlook between diplomats 
responsible for trade and the British merchant houses, who did not 
consider themselves accountable for promoting and representing British 
manufacturers. In other respects they were certainly not conservative; 
they could not have survived the communications revolution and local 
traumas o f the 1870s and 1880s if  they had been. Bill Albert (1985: 
243-245) underlines the way in which merchants transmitted techno­
logical improvements into the agricultural export sectors, even though 
they did not control production directly. In other respects, too, they 
proved innovative and expansionist, to the point of displacing local 
entrepreneurs in some activities. Many placed spare capital in small 
direct investments in Peru, specialising according to their own particular 
expertise. Duncan Fox, for example, who were already involved in 
livestock farming in Chile, developed interests in both agriculture and 
industry in the early twentieth century: in stock-raising in the hacienda 
o f Atocsaico, which they later sold to the Cerro de Pasco Corporation,
20 B alfou r W illiam son archive, letter book 2, A rchibald W illiam son to H arry W il­
liam son, 18 February  1911.
21 Evidence m ainly  from advertisem ents in West Coast Leader during the 1920s, but 
also West Coast Leader, 19 January 1932, and interview  w ith G eorge Bertie, 
form er d irector o f  D uncan Fox, L im a 19 N ovem ber 1971.
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and expanding the La Unión and El Progreso cotton mills in Lima 
(Garland 1905: 96-97; Jiménez 1922: 5). By the early 1930s they also 
had manufacturing interests in polishes, oils, and foodstuffs, probably 
an extension o f their cotton-processing activities.22 Wm. & Jno. Lockett 
formed the British Sugar Company which dominated the Cañete region 
until the firm sold its estates in 1920 (Albert 1976: 219a-245a). Milnes 
had already expanded the Santa Rosa flour mill and taken the lead in 
exploring for petroleum at Lobitos before their association with Balfour 
Williamson became more formal in 1910. They went on to acquire 
sugar estates as well as portfolio investments and directorships in bank­
ing and insurance (Hunt 1960: 73-74).23 Where the merchants main­
tained wholesaling functions they often concentrated not on British 
exports but on goods they produced themselves or acquired along the 
Pacific coast. Thus Milnes and Balfour Williamson became the agents 
for the International Petroleum Company and Lobitos Oilfields Limited 
on the west coast, Duncan Fox for Union Oil and the London and 
Pacific Petroleum Company (Miller 1982b: 406-407). The British, 
therefore, diversified their activities in the primary, secondary, and 
tertiary sectors, developing international commercial links along the 
west coasts of North and South America.
From the time of the First World War, however, the merchants 
faced major problems in expanding their interests further, even though 
they explored many possibilities. At root their difficulties were financial 
and managerial, though to some extent these reflected the wider prob­
lems o f the British economy.24 Those merchants with substantial inter­
ests in trades where they purchased on their own account rather than 
exporting on consignment ran substantial risks if prices fell sharply. In 
cases where they had to foreclose on producers to whom they had 
granted credit facilities, the burden of running estates might make 
matters worse. The blame for the collapse o f Graham Rowe, which 
foundered in 1931 owing over £ 1 million to M artin’s Bank, has been
22 B entinck to  Sim on, 4 February 1932, PRO , FO 371/15787/A 2128/23/51.
23 B W A , letter book 3, A rchibald W illiam son to H arry W illiam son, 3 Septem ber 
1914; West Coast Leader, 10 July 1920.
24 For a discussion o f  these issues in a b roader Latin A m erican context, see G reen- 
h ill/M iller (1998).
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placed on the problems it faced in running cotton plantations, though 
Duncan Fox, which had also taken over estates in the 1920s, managed 
to survive.25 Another problem for the smaller houses was that the larger 
international firms, to whom they looked for support, were themselves 
in difficulties. Balfour Williamson spent much of the 1920s battling to 
make reasonable profits, though they still had the resources to invest in 
Gibsons in 1929. Fluth & Co. had been crippled financially since 1921, 
and massive personal loans to Augusto B. Leguia, deposed as president 
in 1930, made matters worse.26 As for Antony Gibbs & Sons, the big­
gest British merchants on the west coast, one of the family reported in 
October 1931 that they were “for the time being [...] adamantly against 
any expansion in South America” on account of the capital they had 
locked up in Chile following the collapse o f the nitrate industry.27
Ironically, it was just at the point that they were becoming most 
vulnerable that criticisms of the British merchants’ role in Peru became 
most intense. These came from all parts of the Peruvian political spec­
trum, from the hacendados of southern Peru or the sugar planters on the 
one hand to radicals like José Carlos Mariátegui and Víctor Raúl Haya 
de la Torre on the other. Landowners complained of their subjection to 
the British merchant interest, the limitations they placed on the 
availability o f credit, the interest they charged, and the price they paid 
for the exports they traded.28 Mariátegui criticised the British for 
contributing to the distorted development of the country.
Commerce and transport [he declared] are in the hands of foreign capital. 
The latifundistas have been satisfied to serve as the latter’s intermediaries 
in the production o f sugar and cotton. This economic system has kept 
agriculture to a semi-feudal organisation that constitutes the heaviest 
burden on the country’s development (Mariátegui 1971: 17-18).
25 B entinck to Sim on, 4 February 1932, PRO, FO 371/15787/A 2128/23/51; M azzei 
1990: 79. The collapse o f  the Banco del Perú y Londres the previous year w as also 
due in part to its exposure to coastal agriculture (Q uiroz 1993: 82).
26 D obree to K orn, 27 A ugust 1931, GL, G ibbs archive, file 16875/3.
27 W alter G ibbs to Dobree, 9 O ctober 1931, GL, G ibbs archive, file 16875/3.
28 M ore im portant to them , how ever, w ere probably the perceived ‘labour sho rtage’ 
on the Peruvian coast and the fear o f  taxation and governm ent interference.
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Both these issues are complex. The absence of merchant archives makes 
it difficult to generalise on the narrower question of merchant control 
and profits. As this chapter indicates, the potential for abuse varied 
enormously over time and from one sector to another. The British mer­
chants, however, were themselves dependent on prices determined in 
Liverpool and Bradford, and were gradually displaced by more aggres­
sive competitors in cotton and wool. On the broader point that they 
contributed to Peru’s dependence, this was perhaps the inevitable conse­
quence of the distorted orientation of the Peruvian economy, exacer­
bated by the shortage of credit after the Pacific War when the merchants 
concentrated on financing those exports which offered them security in 
a poor country with a limited domestic market and full of economic and 
political uncertainties. However, with a few exceptions, the sectors in 
which they operated as intermediaries remained under the ownership of 
Peruvian landowners who made their own decisions in areas like invest­
ment and labour relations. In essence M ariátegui’s criticism seems as 
much directed at his own country’s elite and at international capitalism 
generally as at specific malpractices or conspiracies of British mer­
chants.
British companies and direct investment
As noted already, after the Pacific War British investment in Peruvian 
government debt was not significant as a result of the legacies o f the 
guano period. Moreover, four years after the Grace Contract of 1889 the 
Peruvian state lost its credit on international capital markets once again 
due to its inability to pay agreed annual subventions to the Peruvian 
Corporation (Miller 1983: 333). This dispute was not settled until 1907, 
permitting some participation by British investors in the so-called ‘Salt 
Loan’ of 1912 for £ 1.2 million (Halsey 1918: 322-356, 520-523; 
Roberts 1992: 139). However, the First World War and the outbreak of 
a new dispute with the Peruvian Corporation, this time over guano ex­
port rights, put another end to government borrowing in London. Two 
small loans were issued in the 1920s, one for £ 1.25 million in 1922 and 
another for £ 2.0 million in 1928, but they were inconsequential in 
comparison with government borrowing in New York, and Peru went
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into default again in 1931 following the fall of Leguia (Wynne 1951: 
182-186; Marichal 1989: 213, 255). The main British investments in 
Peru after the Pacific War thus took the form of direct investments, 
largely in the form of free-standing companies.
This investment arrived in two waves. The first, between 1889 and 
1891, was brought to a precipitate end by the onset o f the Baring Crisis. 
It included the establishment of the Peruvian Corporation to operate the 
concessions transferred to the bondholders under the Grace Contract, 
the foundation o f the London and Pacific Petroleum Company, and a 
handful o f sm aller enterprises including the Peruvian Cotton 
Manufacturing Company and the Backus & Johnston Brewery, both the 
latter being purchased by British investors from Peruvian owners.29 The 
second wave, from about 1905 until 1913, included the formation of 
Lobitos Oil-fields Limited, the Lagunitas Oil Company, two more rail­
way enterprises, and several mining companies. After the First World 
War two more small firms were floated in London to operate mining 
and oil concessions in Peru. However, other entrepreneurs who had 
obtained concessions from the Peruvian government, for a new railway 
scheme and for a national petroleum refinery, failed to find financial 
backing in London.30
It is difficult to put a precise figure on this investment for a number 
of reasons: much of the Peruvian Corporation’s capital was ‘water’; 
issued shares and bonds did not necessarily represent a true value for 
assets, especially when a company accumulated hidden reserves or rein­
vested profits; shares and bonds quoted in London were not necessarily
29 O f these on ly  the Peruvian C orporation and the brew ery w ere quoted  on the Stock 
Exchange. T he Peruvian C otton M anufacturing Co. was later incorporated into the 
G race em pire. In 1913 K esw ick’s heirs sold the L ondon and Pacific Petroleum  Co. 
to S tandard Oil o f  N ew  Jersey, w hich renam ed it as the International Petroleum  Co. 
and registered it as a  subsidiary o f  the Im perial Oil Co., based in Canada. The 
Peruvian C orporation and the B ackus & Johnston B rew ery rem ained in  British 
hands until the m id-1950s.
30 On the railw ay schem e (the D unsm uir concession) see Edgcum be to G rant Duff, 
27 A pril 1922, PRO , FO  371/7242/A 2798. British A m erican T obacco considered 
taking a 33-year lease on the state tobacco m onopoly, w hich w ould have backed 
the bonds issued to finance such a schem e, but in the end rejected the project: 
inform ation from  How ard Cox, January 1999.
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owned by British capitalists; British holdings in some companies were 
certainly little more than minority portfolio interests. Table 1, however, 
provides a listing of those British-owned companies known to be 
operating at the time of the First World War. O f the firms on this list 
little is known about the mining enterprises, which largely faded into 
insignificance soon afterwards. It should also be noted that investments 
in urban utilities, so important to the British position in countries like 
Argentina and Brazil, were limited in value and largely portfolio in 
character in Peru (even the Lima Railways Company leased out its lines 
to the Peruvian Corporation or to Empresas Eléctricas Asociadas). The 
latter firm did have some British involvement in its management after 
1910 as a result o f its debenture flotations, but gradually its direction 
was transferred to Italian and Swiss interests.31 Consequently the 
historical analysis of British investments has tended to concentrate on 
the railways and the oil companies.
It was always difficult to interest British investors in Peru, 
especially after the Baring Crisis of 1890 made Latin American stocks 
unattractive to British investors. The newly established Peruvian 
Corporation thus found it very difficult to finance the repairs and new 
construction to which it had committed itself in the Grace Contract, and 
soon entered into a protracted dispute with the government, each accus­
ing the other of reneging on its obligations (Miller 1983: 333-335). This 
remained unsettled until 1907. For a brief time thereafter British capi­
talists regarded opportunities in Peru more favourably. Balfour W il­
liamson floated Lobitos Oilfields, the Peruvian Corporation issued a 
further £ 1.7 million in debentures, and the North Western Railway and 
Chimbóte Coal and Harbour Syndicate raised money for railway 
projects supported by government guarantees.32 However, both of the 
latter quickly ran into conflicts with the government over their con­
cessions, while in 1913 a new dispute commenced between the Peruvian 
Corporation and the government over its rights to export guano.33 The
31 R oberts (1992: 205); Q uiroz (1993: 85); M iller (1998: 234).
32 M iller (1982b: 402); The Times, 8 April 1908.
33 H uxley to N orm an, 19 Septem ber 1910, PRO, FO  371/970/A 34245; Des G raz to 
Grey, 4 February 1912, PRO, FO 371 /1457 /A 9417; Peruvian C orporation,
Report o f  the Board, 1913; Peruvian C orporation toN icolson, 5 M arch 1914, PRO, 
FO  371/2082/A 9924.
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Table 1: Estimated British direct investment in Peru 







Peruvian C orporation 1890 21,475,450 A lso includes interests in land 
and oil in Pern, and railw ays in 
B olivia. B ook value o f  Peru­
vian railw ay assets in 1915 was 
£ 10,242,013
N orth W estern 
Railw ay
1908 1,014,400
C him bóte Coal and 
H arbour Syndicate
1908 200,000
L im a R ailw ays Co. 1865 500,000
Oilfields
Lobitos O ilfields 1908 360,000
Mines
A poram a G oldfields 1910 300,000
Ferrobam ba 1909 150,000 probably U S-controlled
N ew  C huquitam bo 
G old M ines
1907 44,800
Peruvian C onsoli­
dated Gold T rust
1911 76,047




B ackus & Johnston 
B rew ery
1889 263,500
Santa R osa M illing 1899 175,000 includes assets in Chile
TOTAL 24,774,197
Note: There w ere also m inority  B ritish investm ents in the B anco del Perú y  Londres, 
Empresas Eléctricas A sociadas, Peruvian telephone Co., T icapam pa Silver Co., and the 
International Petroleum  Co. — Source: H alsey (1918: 322-356, 520-523).
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feeling in London towards Peruvian investments, even in this period, 
was summarised in a comment made by the troubled Chimbóte Syndi­
cate to the Foreign Office: “Peruvian stocks were not favourably looked 
upon by London Financial Houses, and Underwriters, unless such issue 
was in the form of Bonds, and interest on same guaranteed by the 
Peruvian Government ‘backed’ by a good and solid tax.”34 This attitude 
also made life difficult for established firms with better prospects.
These problems meant that entrepreneurs like William Keswick, for 
example, would never have been able to capitalise firms like the London 
and Pacific Petroleum Company adequately, even if  he had possessed 
the necessary expertise in the oil industry to make it successful. It was 
hardly surprising that after his death his heirs took the decision to sell it 
to Standard Oil o f New Jersey in 1913 (Brown 1985: 16). Balfour 
Williamson also faced continual problems in financing Lobitos. First 
they delayed the flotation of the company to await an opportune m o­
ment, and then they found that the only way to generate working capital 
was internally through excessive depreciation allowances which created 
hidden reserves (Miller 1982b: 402). The Peruvian Corporation similar­
ly found its expansion constrained by its poor profit record and by the 
difficulties o f raising finance in London. It too turned to internal sources 
o f finance, using undistributed profits to construct extensions in Bolivia 
and Peru in the first decade of the century.35
Peru was also not particularly attractive to the larger multinational 
companies which were becoming a more important component of 
Britain’s direct investments overseas after the turn of the century. Royal 
Dutch Shell briefly looked for concessions in Peru after the First World 
War, allegedly helping to finance Leguia’s coup d ’état in 1919, but they 
then pulled out for geological reasons and because they did not wish to 
challenge Standard Oil. Anglo-Persian took a similar decision.36 In 
banking, both the Bank of London and South America and the Anglo- 
South American Bank flirted with expanding their interests after World
34 H uxley to N orm an, 19 Septem ber 1910, PRO, FO 371/970/A 34245.
35 Peruvian C orporation, Annual Report o f  the Board, 1902, p. 8; and J. J. Im pett to 
C live Sheppard, 17 February 1906, c. 56.4, PCA.
36 Thorp/B ertram  (1978: 101, 109); West Coast Leader, 23 Septem ber 1924, 28 O c­
tober 1924, 3 February  1925, 23 June 1925.
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War I, but determined in the end not to challenge the domestic business 
elite (Quiroz 1993: 77). When BOLSA looked at the possibilities again, 
after the Second World War, it concluded that the country was over­
banked and the barriers to entry high due to the structure of domestic 
business groups.37 Early British industrial multinationals like Unilever 
and J. & P. Coats for the most part declined opportunities in the inter­
war period, and did not commence manufacturing properly in Peru until 
the 1950s. In essence, therefore, British direct investments in Peru re­
solved around railways and oil, with a few smaller interests in textiles, 
flour milling, and brewing. It was the former two sectors that gave rise 
to most o f the problems and disputes associated with the idea of 
business imperialism.
The financial difficulties of these companies on the one hand and 
the government on the other created an explosive mixture, especially 
where enterprises operated under specific concessions or with govern­
ment guarantees. Lobitos is a partial exception. In contrast to London 
and Pacific and its successor, the International Petroleum Company, it 
was subject to normal Peruvian petroleum laws without special dispen­
sations on taxes (Miller 1982b: 414-421; Thorp/Bertram 1978: 108-111; 
Pinelo 1973). Lobitos had its share of labour disputes, with an espe­
cially serious one in 1917, but its relationship with the government 
remained relatively harmonious (Blanchard 1982: 145-146).38 The fact 
that Lobitos did not supply the internal market with fuel and was never 
called upon to do during this period also made for smooth relations with 
the government. However, in the other cases allegations of non-fulfil­
ment of concessions on the one side and non-payment of guarantees on 
the other made disputes frequent, as the examples o f the Peruvian Cor­
poration, International Petroleum Company, North Western Railway, 
and Chimbóte Syndicate all demonstrate. Provincial interests in a politi-
37 General M anager’s R eport on Peru, signed R. A. M cW illiam , 22 D ecem ber 1953, 
BOLSA papers file 4409, L loyd’s B ank archive, London.
38 A part from  the usual device o f  paying retainers to influential law yers and 
consejeros, Lobitos also go t over m inor problem s w ith the governm ent in the 
1920s through the use o f  short-term  loans and gifts to officials: L obitos O ilfields 
L im ited, B oard M inutes, 8 N ovem ber 1921, 14 February 1922, 10 February 1925, 
27 February  1925, Burm ah Oil archive, Swindon.
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cal system dominated by Congress contributed to conflicts because at­
tacks on foreign companies could place a weak government under pres­
sure. Local considerations conditioned the attitudes of many deputies in 
the debates over the Grace Contract, when representatives from the 
south and the mining areas of the centre strongly opposed the agreement 
(Quiroz 1983: 244-245). The Chimbóte Syndicate came under attack 
from deputies from Ancash who feared that the company would fail to 
complete its promised railway.39 Domestic agricultural interests pres­
surised governments to give them, rather than the Peruvian Corporation, 
preference in the extraction o f guano.40 Governments consequently 
wavered between assuaging domestic political feeling and obtaining 
access to the foreign funds which an agreement with British companies 
might encourage.
The poor quality o f foreign management, especially in the early 
stages, contributed little to the resolution of conflicts with the govern­
ment. At its worst it was overlaid with arrogance and racism, as, for 
example, when the chairman of the Peruvian Corporation in 1898 
described Peru as “the typical defaulting Republic of South America”.41 
The Corporation seems to have been surprisingly slow to develop 
efficient management. Initially it preferred to rely on amateurs in the 
railway field, perhaps reflecting the fact that it was founded by financial 
speculators rather than as a transport enterprise. The London board 
frequently overrode the local managers’ views. Only after 1908, first 
with W. L. Morkill and then A. S. Cooper as its representatives in Lima, 
supported by able managing directors in London, was the Corporation 
led by men who, however hard-faced in bargaining with the government 
and trade unions, at least understood the specialised nature of the 
railway business (Miller 1983: 335-338). However, relations between 
the company and the government never remained quiescent for long. 
The Corporation, like railway companies everywhere, faced frequent 
criticisms over the level of its tariffs and standard o f its services. Ini­
39 Des G raz to Grey, 10 D ecem ber 1910, PRO, FO 371/1205 /A 2 3 6 1.
40 Peruvian C orporation , Representative’s Annual Report, 19 1 5 ,pp. 17-18, PCA ; and 
M acera (1977, IV: 333-341).
41 Peruvian C orporation, Report o f  Proceedings at Annual General Meeting, 15 D e­
cem ber 1898, p. 3.
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tially complaints tended to come from specific interest groups: miners 
seeking a reduction in the freight for ore, small farmers complaining 
about the discrimination practised in favour of those who could ship 
large cargoes, southern politicians criticising the preferential tariffs 
given to Bolivian freight (Miller 1983: 339-343). Problems increased 
after the First World War. First the inflation of wages and prices pushed 
the railways against the upper limit of their agreed tariffs and forced 
them to apply to the government for an across-the-board increase. Then 
the libra peruana declined in value during the 1920s. This increased the 
cost of imported supplies and diminished the sterling value o f receipts. 
Nevertheless, the Peruvian Corporation avoided real conflict over tariffs 
until the 1930s, when increasing road competition, a declining exchange 
rate, and wage claims all put pressure on passenger and freight costs.42
All firms with direct investments, whether merchant houses with 
interests in agriculture and manufacturing or the railway and oil 
companies, faced labour problems, especially if they were based in 
Lima/Callao, and particularly at the end o f the First World War. Rail­
way, milling, and textile workers were among the most militant sectors 
o f Peru’s labour force. The first important strike on the Central Railway 
occurred as early as 1892 (Blanchard 1982: 25-26). Milling and textile 
workers became involved in city-wide strikes under anarchist influence 
in 1904 and 1913. Railway workers struck on their own more frequently 
and probably with greater success (Blanchard 1982: 68, 74). The re­
sponse of the Peruvian Corporation seems to have varied according to 
the personality of its representative and the political environment. Mor- 
kill, for example, took a very hard-line approach, even contrary to the 
government, in 1909 and 1913 (Blanchard 1982: 67-69, 155). Cooper, 
his successor, was more conciliatory, pointing out, for example, that 
housing was “quite inadequate” and in some cases “positively disgrace­
ful”, and introducing a superannuation scheme for employees.43 His ap­
proach, however, was aided by the rising traffic receipts o f the Corpo­
ration in the 1920s and Leguia’s co-option o f much of the labour
42 El Pueblo (A requipa), 29 A ugust and 4 Septem ber 1934; m em orandum  by  M. Y. 
G rant, 17 M arch 1931, file 69, PCA; Peruvian C orporation, Representative’s 
Annual Report, 1931, and Representative’s Annual Report, 1932, pp. 7-8, PCA.
43 Peruvian C orporation, Representative 's Annual Report, 1920, pp. 7-8, PCA.
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movement. When, in the 1930s, declining economic conditions coin­
cided with a government much more antagonistic towards foreign firms, 
the Peruvian Corporation ran into a series of bitter conflicts with its 
workforce, especially in Arequipa where, because of the Southern Rail­
way management’s poor relations with the local economic elite, its only 
allies seemed to be a few government and police officials, to whom the 
company paid bribes.44
Conclusion: the dynamics of British business 
and its role in Peru
This paper represents the first real attempt to draw together historical 
research on British interests in Peru before and after the Pacific War. 
However, research on the topic is fraught with difficulties, and it is 
important to recognise its limitations. The archival material is extremely 
patchy. Gibbs’ records on guano and nitrate are superb, but most of the 
other merchants’ papers have vanished. Despite its size the contents of 
the Peruvian Corporation archives are disappointing, although Lobitos, 
as a company, is much better documented. Thus historians have to 
reconstruct British business activities in Peru after the Pacific War from 
rather fragmentary data. The extent to which one can generalise from 
the Peruvian case is also debatable. The profile of British business in 
Peru was unique in Latin America, due to the continued heightened role 
of merchants, the problems of direct investment, and the lack of govern­
ment borrowing. For the British this meant that the management of 
Anglo-Peruvian relations, especially after the First World War, never 
presented the difficulties that Argentina, Brazil, or Uruguay did. How­
ever, despite this distinctiveness this study does shed some light on both 
the major bodies of literature which provide a context for research: that 
on the dynamism and structure of British business overseas and that on 
informal and business imperialism.
44 Peruvian C orporation, Representative's Annual Report, 1934, file 333, PCA; El 
Pueblo, 20 A ugust 1934; L. S. B laisdell to F. F. H ixson, 29 A ugust 1935, c. 19.8, 
PCA.
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The British in Peru were always just one part of a cosmopolitan 
business elite, which included other foreign, immigrant, and domestic 
entrepreneurs. Even in the inter-war period the British community in 
Peru probably numbered no more than 1,600 people, much less than its 
counterparts in other Latin American countries.45 While the aftermath of 
the Pacific War strengthened the British merchant position in Peru and 
saw the initiation of some important direct investments, both by the 
merchants and by London-registered companies, this dynamism was 
relatively short-lived and the pattern established then persisted until the 
mid-twentieth century. External factors imposed limits to the entrepre­
neurship o f the merchants. Although they were constantly on the look­
out for new opportunities, the reluctance of London financiers to invest 
in Peru made it difficult to raise funds on the scale necessary to pursue 
many of the projects. The success of M ilnes’ and Balfour Williamson’s 
partnership in developing Lobitos was partly fortuitous, in that they 
managed to float the company during the one period after the early 
1870s, 1908-13, when the City showed some interest in Peru (Miller 
1982b: 402). Other groups were less perceptive or less fortunate. An­
tony Gibbs and Sons, when offered the opportunity to participate in the 
Cerro de Pasco copper industry in 1900, still thought in terms of the 
type o f financing and consignment arrangements which they had 
adopted in mid nineteenth-century Chile, rather than on the scale 
necessary for the increasingly cartelised industry of the early twentieth 
century.46 The Peruvian Corporation also totally underestimated the 
significance of the copper resources of the central sierra and could not 
finance its concessions.47 Thus mining fell into US hands. And despite 
the continued importance of British markets the Liverpool and London 
merchant houses which had been so significant immediately after the 
Pacific War eventually became overshadowed by a US competitor with 
strong connections in London, W. R. Grace & Co. By 1914 Grace was 
the leading foreign merchant house in Peru, with both a strong import-
45 L im a C hancery  to Foreign Office, 9 April 1935, PRO , FO  371/18696/A 4050/ 
1536/51.
46 L ondon to V alparaiso, 30 N ovem ber 1900 and 25 January 1901, GL, G ibbs 
archive, file 11471/68.
47 J. J. Im pett to A. Schatzm ann, 8 M arch 1904, file B 1/6, PCA.
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export business and a range of direct investments, especially in textiles 
and sugar, precisely the areas where the British should have possessed 
advantages.
During the 1920s British business suffered from a number of further 
difficulties which other foreign interests were able to avoid. First, the 
British government imposed unprecedented barriers to foreign lending. 
This meant that British entrepreneurs were unable to raise capital for 
the principal concessions they secured from the Leguia government or 
which were brought to the City by businessmen of other nationalities. 
The one major British concession secured and put into operation in the 
1920s was the Marconi Contract for the operation of the country’s posts 
and telecommunications. Surrounded by scandal and controversy, it was 
cancelled after the fall of Leguia.48 At the same time the volatility of 
commodity markets undermined the core Peruvian business o f the mer­
chant houses, bringing about the collapse o f Graham Rowe, which had 
been present in Peru for over a hundred years. Given the international 
operations of many of the firms in Lima, the problems faced by the 
Chilean branches of Huth, Gibbs, Duncan Fox, Graham Rowe, and 
Balfour Williamson after the mid-1920s clearly reduced the resources 
they could mobilise for Peru. In Lima the British were eventually 
squeezed between the powerful domestic business groups which had 
developed since the Pacific War and the US multinationals which could 
generate much greater resources of their own for investment. Those 
firms like Duncan Fox which did survive in Lima, as well as the British 
industrial multinationals which arrived after the Second World War, 
succeeded only by co-operating with powerful domestic families like 
the Wiese or the Fe-rreyros. In the end the smaller free-standing 
companies were also sold to groups of this kind, Santa Rosa in 1951 and 
Backus & Johnston in 1955.
Overall the British certainly contributed to Peru’s dependence on 
exports, both through merchant finance and through their possession of 
the railways. However, except for Lobitos’ interests in oil, they never 
took control of export production themselves on any scale, in contrast 
to US dominance of mining and petroleum. This had various conse­
48 West Coast Leader, 14 M ay 1921, 4 D ecem ber 1922, 1 Septem ber 1925, 12 April 
1932.
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quences. It meant a fairly high ‘returned value’ for Peru in sugar, 
cotton, and wool (as in guano), and aided the growth of a domestic 
business elite based on the coast. The limited scale of British investment 
after 1890 did not create the balance of payments problems that the 
leakage of foreign exchange to pay interest and dividends did for Ar­
gentina and Brazil. British merchants did offer Peruvian producers 
access to credit at much lower interest rates than ruled locally, espe­
cially in the 1880s and 1890s. This aided the recovery o f the sugar 
industry at a time of severe world competition and then the expansion of 
the cotton trade. These arguments, however, lead discussion about 
Peru’s development problems back to the strategies adopted by the state 
and domestic business elite to manage, distribute, and reinvest the 
wealth which the country’s export success gave them. Much more 
research is required on the domestic business groups which arose in the 
aftermath of the Pacific War and their relationship with the state.49
To deal finally, with perhaps the key question arising from the 
imperialism debate, it is difficult to see British interests as controlling 
economic policy in Peru. In both the guano and nitrate trades before the 
Pacific War the Lima government had taken the lead in policy-making, 
although it was always acting within the constraints of the massive 
indebtedness incurred by earlier administrations. In the Grace Contract 
negotiations it was the Cáceres government that decided that recovering 
its credit abroad was a sufficient priority for it to override nationalist 
feeling and constitutional niceties. It thus put itself at the mercy of the 
speculators who surrounded the Bondholders’ Committee. As the econ­
omy recovered in the late 1890s domestic financial interests displaced 
the foreign insurance companies and developed the banks. The key 
areas of fiscal and monetary policy were reserved to the government 
throughout the period. Since there was no government debt o f any 
significance Peru did not undergo the experience of Argentina and 
Brazil in the 1890s when, to some extent, domestic economic policies 
were dictated by the need to maintain the confidence of British creditors 
(Marichal 1989: chap. 6). The lack of dependence on foreign loans after
49 T he only w orks w hich really analyse any o f  the dom estic business groups in depth 
are B urga/F lores G alindo (1979), G ilbert (1982), G onzales (1985), Portocarrero 
(1986) and R eaño/V ásquez (1988).
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its default in 1876 gave Peruvian governments a freedom of action 
denied to other countries which felt it necessary to appease the London 
capital markets. Whether they used it effectively is another question.
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